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Out-of-Sample Equity Premium Prediction:
Fundamental vs. Technical Analysis
Abstract
We compare the ability of economic fundamentals and technical trading rules to forecast
the monthly U.S. equity premium using out-of-sample tests for 1960–2008. Both approaches
provide statistically and economically signiﬁcant out-of-sample forecasting gains, which are
highly concentrated in U.S. business-cycle recessions. Nevertheless, fundamental and techni-
cal analysis capture different sources of equity premium ﬂuctuations, and the two approaches
appear largely complementary: technical rules detect the typical decline in the equity pre-
mium near cyclical peaks; economic fundamentals more readily pick up the typical rise in the
equity premium near cyclical troughs. We also simulate data from two recent general equi-
librium models—the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit-formation and Bansal and Yaron
(2004) long-run risks models—that link rational equity premium predictability to macroeco-
nomic shocks. Empirical p-values indicate that these models do not account for much of the
out-of-sample forecasting gains evidenced by fundamental and, especially, technical analysis.
JEL classiﬁcations: C22, C53, E32, G11, G12, G17
Keywords: Equity premium predictability; Economic fundamentals; Moving-average rules;
Momentum; Volume; Out-of-sampleforecasts; Assetallocation; Mean-varianceinvestor; Busi-
ness cycle; Habit-formation model; Long-run risks modelResearchers have long investigated two very different methods of predicting aggregate stock
returns: fundamental and technical analysis. Fundamental analysis uses valuation ratios, interest
rates, term and credit spreads, and related economic variables to forecast excess stock returns or,
equivalently, the equity premium. In contrast, technical analysis studies past stock price behavior,
often in conjunction with volume, to ascertain future price movements and thereby guide trading
decisions.
Economic fundamentals are commonly analyzed using a predictive regression framework, in
which the equity premium is regressed on a lagged potential predictor. Rozeff (1984), Fama and
French (1988), and Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b) employ this framework and present evi-
dence that valuation ratios, such as the dividend yield, predict the U.S. equity premium. Similarly,
Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell (1987), Breen, Glosten, and Jagannathan (1989), and
Fama and French (1989) ﬁnd predictive ability for nominal interest rates and the default and term
spreads, while Nelson (1976) and Fama and Schwert (1977) detect predictive capability for the in-
ﬂation rate. More recent studies continue to support equity premium predictability using valuation
ratios (Cochrane (2008), P´ astor and Stambaugh (2009)), interest rates (Ang and Bekaert (2007)),
and inﬂation (Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004)). Other studies identify additional economic vari-
ables with predictive power, including corporate equity issuing activity (Baker and Wurgler (2000),
Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson, and Roberts (2007)), the consumption-wealth ratio (Lettau and
Ludvigson (2001)), and volatility (Guo (2006)).
Technical analysis dates at least to 1700 and was popularized in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries by the “Dow Theory” of Charles Dow and William Peter Hamilton.1 Numerous
studies examine the proﬁtability of technical trading rules in equity markets. Early studies, includ-
ing Cowles (1933), Fama and Blume (1966), and Jensen and Benington (1970), report mixed re-
sults for a variety of popular technical indicators. More recently, Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron
(1992) ﬁnd that moving-average and trading-range-break rules have predictive power for the Dow
Jones index for 1897–1986, and Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2000) ﬁnd that several technical indi-
cators based on automatic pattern recognition with kernel regressions have some practical value.
Using White’s (2000) “reality check” bootstrap, Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) conﬁrm
the results for 1897–1986 in Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), but they ﬁnd little support
for the proﬁtability of trading rules for 1987–1996.2
1Nison (1991) notes that Munehisa Homma reportedly made a fortune in eighteenth-century Japan using an early
version of “candlestick” patterns to predict rice market prices using past prices. Schwager (1993, 1995) and Covel
(2005) discuss how technical analysis is an important tool for many of today’s most successful traders.
2Park and Irwin (2007) provide a survey of the empirical literature on technical analysis. Zhu and Zhou (2009) and
1The literatures on fundamental and technical analysis have evolved largely independently. In
the present paper, we merge the two literatures by employing technical indicators in the same
way that economic fundamentals are used to forecast the equity premium, thereby enabling us
to address a number of interesting issues surrounding fundamental and technical approaches to
predicting stock returns: Do the two approaches demonstrate comparable predictive power? Do
economic fundamentals and technical indicators capture similar return predictability patterns in
the data? Should the two approaches be viewed as substitutes or complements in asset-allocation
decisions? Can rational ﬂuctuations in the expected equity premium explain the predictive ability
of either or both approaches? Our analysis of these issues has four basic components.
First, we compare equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals and technical
tradingrules intermsof theCampbelland Thompson(2008)out-of-sample R2 statistic, R2
OS, which
measures the reduction in mean square prediction error (MSPE) for a competing forecast relative
to the historical average (random walk with drift) benchmark forecast. For assessing return pre-
dictability, Goyal and Welch (2008) show that out-of-sample criteria are important. We generate
equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals in the usual manner via recursively
estimated predictive regression models. Similarly, we transform the trading signals produced by
technical rules into equity premium forecasts using a recursive predictive regression framework.
This allows us to directly compare equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals and
technical rules in terms of MSPE. We analyze the forecasting ability of a variety of economic fun-
damentals from the literature and popular moving-average (MA), momentum, and volume-based
technical trading rules.
Second, we compare the economic value of equity premium forecasts based on fundamental
and technical analysis from an asset-allocation perspective. Speciﬁcally, we calculate utility gains
for a mean-variance investor who optimally allocates a portfolio between equities and risk-free
Treasury bills using equity premium forecasts based on either economic fundamentals or techni-
cal rules relative to an investor who uses the historical average equity premium forecast. While
numerous studies investigate the proﬁtability of technical indicators, these studies are ad hoc in
that they do no account for risk aversion in the asset-allocation decision. Analogous to Zhu and
Zhou (2009), we address this drawback and compare the utility gains for a risk-averse investor who
forecasts the equity premium using economic fundamentals to those of an identical investor who
forecasts the equity premium with technical rules.
references therein provide some theoretical reasons why technical analysis can be proﬁtable.
2Third, to investigate links between out-of-sample return predictability and the real economy,
we compute the R2
OS statistics and utility gains over both NBER-dated cyclical expansions and
recessions, and we examine closely the behavior of the forecasts over the course of recessions. In-
sofar as predictability is linked to the real economy, we expect that there will be more predictability
in the rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions of recessions (e.g., Henkel, Martin, and Nadari
(2009)).
Fourth, we explore whether rational ﬂuctuations in the expected equity risk premium can ac-
count for the out-of-sample forecasting gains evidenced by economic fundamentals and technical
rules. Given our interest in measuring forecasting gains over different business-cycle phases, we
generate simulated data using two leading general equilibrium models that imply rational equity
premium predictability in response to macroeconomic shocks, namely, the Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) habit-formation and Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risks models.
We ﬁnd that monthly equity premium forecasts based on either economic fundamentals or
technical rules produce economically signiﬁcant R2
OS statistics and utility gains, but that the gains
are highly concentrated in recessions. This is especially evident for the utility metric. For example,
a mean-variance investor with a risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve would pay an annualized portfolio
management fee of 1.82% to have access to the equity premium forecast based on the dividend
yield relative to the historical average benchmark forecast for the entire 1960:01–2008:12 forecast
evaluation period; during recessions, the same investor would pay a hefty annual fee of 13.02%.
Similarly, an investor with the same preferences would pay a fee of 3.07% during the full forecast
evaluation period and a very substantial fee of 14.97% during recessions for access to an equity
premium forecast based on a monthly MA(1,12) technical rule rather than the historical average
benchmark.
Although economic fundamentals and technical rules both forecast better than the benchmark
during recessions, the two approaches exploit different patterns. Technical rules detect the typical
fall in the equity premium near business-cycle peaks, while economic fundamentals correctly pick
up the typical rise in the equity premium later in recessions near business-cycle troughs. These
results may help to explain the simultaneously prominent roles for economic fundamentals in the
academic literature and technical indicators among practitioners. Both approaches seem useful for
predicting returns, neither approach clearly outperforms the other, and they appear to complement
each other. Indeed, we show that pooling information from both the fundamental and technical
approaches provides additional out-of-sample gains relative to using each approach in isolation.
3Finally, empirical p-values generated using the habit-formation or long-run risks model indi-
catethatthesemodelscannotaccountformuchoftheout-of-sampleforecastinggainsevidencedby
economic fundamentals and technical rules, particularly technical rules during recessions. It thus
appears that economic fundamentals and, especially, technical rules capture something beyond the
rational equity premium predictability implied by the habit-formation and long-run risks models.
Behavioral models seem to offer some explanations. Hong and Stein (1999) and Hong, Lim, and
Stein (2000) provide both theory and empirical evidence on the slow transmission of bad news in
ﬁnancial markets. Recessions are presumably associated with large adverse macroeconomic news
shocks, which may take longer to be fully incorporated into stock prices. As a result, the market
will exhibit stronger trending patterns during recessions, creating greater scope for trend-based
technical rules to forecast equity prices. Consistent with this is the disposition effect—investors
tend to hold losers too long and sell winners too early (Odean (1998)). During the early stages of
recessions, there are more share price declines and hence more losers; this implies that the dispo-
sition effect is stronger in recessions, thereby reinforcing the stronger trend. In general, our results
point to the importance in future research of developing and testing general equilibrium models
capable of accounting for the predictive ability of both economic fundamentals and technical rules
over the business cycle.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I outlines the construction of
equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals and technical trading rules, as well
as the forecast evaluation criteria. Section II reports the out-of-sample test results. Section III
examines the ability of the habit-formation and long-run risks models to account for the out-of-
sample results. Section IV contains concluding remarks.
I. Econometric Methodology
This section describes the construction and evaluation of out-of-sample equity premium fore-
casts based on economic fundamentals and technical rules.
A. Forecast Construction
The conventional framework for analyzing equity premium predictability based on economic
fundamentals is the following predictive regression model:
rt+1 = ai+bixi;t +ei;t+1; (1)
4where rt+1 is the return on a broad stock market index in excess of the risk-free rate from period
t to t +1, xi;t is a predictor (e.g., the dividend yield), and ei;t+1 is a zero-mean disturbance term.
Following Campbell and Thompson (2008) and Goyal and Welch (2008), we generate an out-of-
sample forecast of rt+1 based on (1) and information through period t as
ˆ ri;t+1 = ˆ ai;t + ˆ bi;txi;t; (2)
where ˆ ai;t and ˆ bi;t are the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of ai and bi, respectively, in
(1) computed by regressing frkgt
k=2 on a constant and fxi;kgt 1
k=1. Dividing the total sample of
T observations into q1 in-sample and q2 out-of-sample observations, where T = q1+q2, we can
calculate a series of out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on xi;t over the last q2 obser-
vations: fˆ ri;t+1gT 1
t=q1.3 The historical average of the equity premium, ¯ rt+1 = (1=t)å
t
k=1rk, is a
natural benchmark forecast corresponding to the random walk with drift model (bi = 0 in (1)).
Goyal and Welch (2008) show that ¯ rt+1 is a stringent benchmark: predictive regression forecasts
based on economic fundamentals frequently fail to outperform the historical average forecast in
out-of-sample tests.
Campbell and Thompson (2008) demonstrate that restrictions improve individual predictive
regression forecasts based on economic fundamentals, allowing them to more consistently outper-
form the historical average forecast of the equity premium. For example, theory often indicates
the expected sign of bi in (1), so that we set bi = 0 when forming a forecast if the estimated
slope coefﬁcient does not have the expected sign. Campbell and Thompson (2008) also recom-
mend setting the equity premium forecast to zero if the predictive regression forecast is negative,
since risk considerations typically imply a positive expected equity premium based on economic
fundamentals.
Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) analyze the gains from pooling N individual predictive re-
gression forecasts. A pooled forecast takes the form,
ˆ rp;t+1 =
N
å
i=1
wi;tˆ ri;t+1; (3)
where fwi;tgN
i=1 are the ex ante combining weights and å
N
i=1wi;t = 1. Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou
(2010) show that a simple pooling scheme (wi;t = 1=N for all i;t) consistently outperforms the his-
3Observe that the forecasts are generated using a recursive (or expanding) window for estimating ai and bi in (1).
Forecasts could also be generated using a rolling window (which drops earlier observations as additional observations
become available) in recognition of potential structural instability. Pesaran and Timmermann (2007) and Clark and
McCracken (2009), however, show that the optimal estimation window for a quadratic loss function can include pre-
break data due to the familiar bias-efﬁciency tradeoff. We use recursive estimation windows in Section II, although
we obtain similar results using rolling estimation windows of various sizes.
5torical average benchmark forecast, despite the inconsistent performance of individual forecasts.4
In Section II, we generate N = 14 individual predictive regression forecasts of the monthly eq-
uity premium with Campbell and Thompson (2008) restrictions imposed, where each individual
forecast is based on an economic fundamental from the literature. We also compute a pooled fore-
cast as a simple average of these N = 14 individual predictive regression forecasts. While more
elaborate pooling schemes are available, relatively simple schemes that hew more closely to equal
weighting typically perform better than elaborate schemes when N is large (Timmermann (2006)).
In addition to economic fundamentals, we consider three popular types of technical trading
rules. The ﬁrst is an MA rule that, in its simplest form, generates a buy or sell signal (St = 1 or
St = 0, respectively) at the end of period t by comparing two moving averages:
St =

1 if MAs;t  MAl;t
0 if MAs;t < MAl;t
; (4)
where
MAj;t = (1=j)
j 1
å
i=0
Pt i for j = s;l; (5)
Pt is the level of a stock price index, and s (l) is the length of the short (long) MA (s < l). We
denote the MA rule with MA lengths s and l as MA(s;l). Intuitively, the MA rule is designed to
detect changes in stock price trends. For example, when prices have been recently falling, the short
MA will tend to be lower than the long MA. If prices begin trending upward, then the short MA
tends to increase faster than the long MA, eventually exceeding the long MA and generating a buy
signal. In Section II, we analyze monthly MA rules with s = 1 and l = 3;6;9;12.
The second type of technical rule we consider is based on momentum. A simple momentum
rule generates the following signal:
St =

1 if Pt  Pt m
0 if Pt < Pt m
: (6)
Intuitively, a current stock price that is higher than its level m periods ago is interpreted as an
indicator of “positive” momentum and thus relatively high expected excess returns for periodt+1,
4Rapach, Strauss, and Zhou (2010) show that simple averaging is a type of shrinkage forecast that stabilizes
individual forecasts and thereby provides out-of-sample gains more consistently over time. Mamaysky, Spiegel, and
Zhang (2007) pool predictions from an OLS model and the Kalman ﬁlter model of Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang
(2008) to signiﬁcantly increase the number of mutual funds with predictable out-of-sample alphas. Timmermann
(2008) pools forecasts from linear and nonlinear autoregressive models of monthly stock returns. Goyal and Welch
(2008) ﬁnd that simply including numerous predictors simultaneously in the same regression—the “kitchen sink”
model—performs very poorly in out-of-sample equity premium forecasting. This is not surprising; it is well known
that unrestricted, highly parameterized models often overﬁt the in-sample data and forecast poorly out-of-sample.
Ludvigson and Ng (2007) pursue an alternative strategy by incorporating information from a very large number of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables to predict stock returns and volatility using a dynamic factor model.
6which generates a buy signal. We denote the momentum rule that compares Pt to Pt m as MOM(m),
and we compute monthly signals for m = 3;6;9;12 in Section II.
Technicalanalystsfrequentlyusevolumedatainconjunctionwithpastpricestoidentifymarket
trends. In light of this, the ﬁnal type of technical rule we consider employs “on-balance” volume
(e.g., Granville (1963)). We ﬁrst deﬁne
OBVt =
t
å
k=1
VOLkDk; (7)
where VOLk is a measure of the trading volume during period k and Dk is a binary variable that
takes a value of 1 if Pk Pk 1  0 and  1 otherwise. We then form a trading signal from OBVt as
St =
(
1 if MAOBV
s;t  MAOBV
l;t
0 if MAOBV
s;t < MAOBV
l;t
; (8)
where
MAOBV
j;t = (1=j)
j 1
å
i=0
OBVt i for j = s;l: (9)
Intuitively, relatively high recent volume together with recent price increases, say, indicate a strong
positive market trend and generate a buy signal. In Section II, we compute monthly signals for
s = 1 and l = 3;6;9;12.
The three types of trading rules we consider (MA, momentum, and volume) conveniently cap-
ture the trend-following idea at the center of technical analysis and are representative of the techni-
cal rules analyzed in the academic literature (e.g., Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), Sulli-
van, Timmermann, and White (1999)). To directly compare these trading rules to equity premium
forecasts based on economic fundamentals, we transform the trading signals to point forecasts of
the equity premium by replacing the economic fundamental xi;t in the predictive regression, (1),
with St from (4), (6), or (8). We then generate out-of-sample equity premium forecasts using St as
the explanatory variable in a manner analogous to the forecasts based on economic fundamentals
described earlier, and we again compute a pooled forecast as a simple average of the individual
forecasts generated from technical rules.
B. Forecast Evaluation
We consider two metrics for evaluating forecasts based on economic fundamentals and tech-
nical rules. The ﬁrst is the Campbell and Thompson (2008) R2
OS statistic, which measures the
7proportional reduction in MSPE for a competing model relative to the historical average forecast:
R2
OS = 1 
å
q2
k=1(rq1+k  ˆ rq1+k)2
å
q2
k=1(rq1+k  ¯ rq1+k)2; (10)
where ˆ rq1+k represents an equity premium forecast based on an economic fundamental or technical
rule. Clearly, when R2
OS > 0, the competing forecast outperforms the historical average benchmark
in terms of MSPE. We employ the Clark and West (2007) MSPE-adjusted statistic to test the
null hypothesis that the competing and historical average forecasts have equal MSPE against the
one-sided alternative hypothesis that the competing forecast has a lower MSPE, corresponding to
H0 : R2
OS = 0 against HA : R2
OS > 0. Clark and West (2007) develop the MSPE-adjusted statistic
by modifying the familiar Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) statistic so that it has a
standard normal asymptotic distribution when comparing forecasts from nested models. Compar-
ing the fundamental or technical forecasts with the historical average forecast entails comparing
nested models, since setting bi = 0 in (1) yields the random walk with drift model.5
R2
OS statistics are typically small for equity premium forecasts, as aggregate excess returns
inherently contain a large unpredictable component, but a relatively small R2
OS statistic can still
signal economically important gains for an investor (Kandel and Stambaugh (1996), Xu (2004),
Campbell and Thompson (2008)). From an asset-allocation perspective, however, the utility gain
itself is the key metric. As a second metric for evaluating forecasts, we thus compute realized
utility gains for a mean-variance investor who optimally allocates across stocks and risk-free bills,
as in, among others, Marquering and Verbeek (2004) and Campbell and Thompson (2008). As
discussed in the introduction, this procedure addresses the weakness of many existing studies of
technical trading rules that fail to incorporate the degree of risk aversion into the asset-allocation
decision.
In particular, we compute the average utility for a mean-variance investor with a risk aver-
sion coefﬁcient of ﬁve who monthly allocates between stocks and risk-free bills using an equity
premium forecast based on an economic fundamental or technical rule. Following Campbell and
Thompson (2008), we assume that the investor uses a ﬁve-year moving window of past monthly
returns to estimate the variance of excess returns.6 We then calculate the average utility for the
5While the Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) statistic has a standard normal asymptotic distribution
when comparing forecasts from non-nested models, Clark and McCracken (2001) and McCracken (2007) show that it
has a complicated non-standard distribution when comparing forecasts from nested models. The non-standard distri-
bution can lead the Diebold and Mariano (1995) and West (1996) statistic to be severely undersized when comparing
forecasts from nested models, thereby substantially reducing power.
6Again following Campbell and Thompson (2008), we constrain the equity weight in the portfolio to lie between
0% and 150%
8same investor using the historical average forecast of the equity premium. The utility gain is the
difference between the two average utilities. We multiply this difference by 1200, so that it can be
interpreted as the annual percentage portfolio management fee that an investor would be willing
to pay to have access to the fundamental or technical forecast relative to the historical average
forecast.
II. Empirical Results
This section describes the data and reports the out-of-sample test results for the R2
OS statistics
and average utility gains.
A. Data
Our monthly data span 1927:01–2008:12. The data are from Amit Goyal’s web page, which
provides updated data from Goyal and Welch (2008).7 The aggregate market return is the con-
tinuously compounded return on the S&P 500 (including dividends), and the equity premium is
the difference between the aggregate market return and the Treasury bill rate. The following 14
economic variables, which are well representative of the literature (Goyal and Welch (2008)), con-
stitute the set of economic fundamentals used to predict the equity premium:
 Dividend-price ratio (log), DP: log of dividends paid on the S&P 500 index minus the log
of stock prices (S&P 500 index), where dividends are measured as a twelve-month moving
sum.
 Dividend yield (log), DY: log of dividends minus the log of lagged stock prices.
 Earnings-price ratio (log), EP: log of earnings on the S&P 500 index minus the log of stock
prices, where earnings are measured as a twelve-month moving sum.
 Dividend-payout ratio (log), DE: log of dividends minus log of earnings.
 Stock variance, SVAR: monthly sum of squared daily returns on the S&P 500 index.
 Book-to-market ratio, BM: book-to-market value ratio for the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
 Net equity expansion, NTIS: ratio of twelve-month moving sum of net equity issues by
NYSE-listed stocks to total end-of-year market capitalization of NYSE stocks.
7The data are available at http://www.bus.emory.edu/AGoyal/Research.html.
9 Treasury bill rate, TBL: interest rate on a three-month Treasury bill (secondary market).
 Long-term yield, LTY: long-term government bond yield.
 Long-term return, LTR: return on long-term government bonds.
 Term spread, TMS: long-term yield minus the Treasury bill rate.
 Default yield spread, DFY: BAA- minus AAA-rated corporate bond yields.
 Default return spread, DFR: long-term corporate bond return minus the long-term govern-
ment bond return.
 Inﬂation, INFL: calculated from the CPI (all urban consumers); we follow Goyal and Welch
(2008) and use xi;t 1 in (1) for inﬂation to account for the delay in CPI releases.
We use the S&P 500 index for Pt when computing the trading signals based on the MA and mo-
mentum rules in (4) and (6), respectively. In addition to the S&P 500 index, we use monthly
volume data (beginning in 1940:01) from Google Finance to compute the trading signal in (8).8
B. R2
OS Statistics
Panel A of Table I reports R2
OS statistics for predictive regression forecasts based on economic
fundamentals over the 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evaluation period. We use 1926:01–1959:12
as the initial in-sample period when forming the recursive out-of-sample forecasts. We assess
the statistical signiﬁcance of R2
OS using the Clark and West (2007) MSPE-adjusted statistic, as
described in Section I. We compute R2
OS statistics separately for the full 1960:01–2008:12 forecast
evaluation period, as well as NBER-dated expansions and recessions.9 The U.S. economy is in
recession for 87 of the 588 months (15%) spanning 1960:01–2008:12.
According to the second column of Table I, Panel A, nine of the 14 individual economic fun-
damentals produce positive R2
OS statistics over the full 1960:01–2008:12 out-of-sample period, so
that they outperform the historical average benchmark forecast in terms of MSPE. Six of the nine
8The volume data are available at http://www.google.com/ﬁnance. While daily data are frequently used to generate
trading signals using technical indicators, we compute technical rules using monthly data to put the forecasts based
on economic fundamentals and technical rules on a more equal footing. In ongoing research, we are investigating
the use of daily data to generate monthly trading signals to study the more practical problem of maximizing portfolio
performance using technical rules.
9NBER peak and trough dates that deﬁne the expansion and recession phases of the U.S. business cycle are avail-
able at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
10positive R2
OS statistics for the individual fundamentals are signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better.
DP and DY have the highest R2
OS statistics, 0.73% and 0.71%, respectively, among the individual
economic fundamentals. The fourth and sixth columns of Table I report R2
OS statistics separately
for business-cycle expansions and recessions, respectively. Recessions markedly enhance the out-
of-sample predictive ability of most economic fundamentals compared to the historical average.
For example, the predictive ability of DP and DY is highly concentrated in recessions: the R2
OS
statistics for DP (DY) are 0.15% and 2.15% ( 0:26% and 3.09%) during expansions and reces-
sions, respectively. The R2
OS statistics for DP, DY, LTR, and TMS are signiﬁcant at the 5% level
during recessions, despite the reduced number of available observations. Panel C of Table I also
reports R2
OS statistics for the pooled economic fundamental forecast (POOL-ECON) based on (3)
with wi;t = 1=N (N = 14). The R2
OS is 0.80% for the POOL-ECON forecast, which is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level and greater than the R2
OS for any of the individual fundamental forecasts. The
POOL-ECON forecast also has an R2
OS that is higher during recessions than expansions (1.01%
and 0.72%, respectively, both of which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level).
To illustrate how equity premium forecasts vary over the business cycle, Figure 1 graphs the
individual fundamental forecasts and POOL-ECON forecast, along with the historical average
benchmark. The vertical bars in the ﬁgure depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions. Many of
the individual predictive regression forecasts—especially those that perform the best during reces-
sions, such as DP, DY, LTR, and TMS—often increase substantially above the historical average
forecast over the course of recessions, reaching distinct local maxima near business-cycle troughs.
This is particularly evident during more severe recessions, such as the mid 1970s, early 1980s, and
the most recent recession. While averaging across individual forecasts produces a smoother fore-
cast, the POOL-ECON forecast also exhibits distinct spikes above the historical average forecast
during severe recessions. The countercyclical ﬂuctuations in equity premium forecasts in Figure
1 are similar to the countercyclical ﬂuctuations in in-sample expected equity premium estimates
reported in, for example, Fama and French (1989), Ferson and Harvey (1991), Whitelaw (1994),
Harvey (2001), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2009). The ﬁfth and seventh columns of Table I, Panel
A show that the average forecast value is higher during recessions than expansions for a number
of economic fundamentals, especially DP and DY.
Figure 2 provides time-series perspective on the out-of-sample predictive ability of economic
fundamentals over the business cycle. The ﬁgure portrays the cumulative differences in square
prediction errors between the historical average forecast and forecasts based on economic fun-
11damentals.10 A segment of the curve that is higher (lower) at its end point relative to its initial
point indicates that the fundamental forecast outperforms (underperforms) the historical average
forecast in terms of MSPE over the period corresponding to the segment. The curves are predom-
inantly positively sloped—sometimes quite steeply—during many recessions in Figure 2; outside
of recessions, the curves are often ﬂat or negatively sloped.
We turn next to the forecasting performance of the technical rules in Table I, Panel B. For the
MA and momentum rules in (4) and (6), respectively, we again use data for 1928:01–1959:12 as
the initial in-sample period to estimate the predictive regression model that transforms the trading
signals to point forecasts. Data availability limits the starting date for the volume rules’ in-sample
period to 1940:01. The second column of Table I, Panel B shows that seven of the twelve individ-
ual technical forecasts have positive R2
OS statistics, so that they outperform the historical average
forecast according to the MSPE metric. Two of the seven positive R2
OS statistics are signiﬁcant
at conventional levels (MA(1,12) and MOM(9)). The R2
OS is also positive for the POOL-TECH
forecast in Panel C, which is a simple average of the individual technical forecasts, but the statistic
is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The fourth and sixth columns of Panel B show even starker
differences in forecasting performance across business-cycle phases for the technical forecasts in
Panel B compared to the fundamental forecasts in Panel A. Eleven of the twelve individual tech-
nical forecasts exhibit negative R2
OS statistics during expansions, while all forecasts have positive
R2
OS statistics during recessions; ten of these positive statistics are signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Moreover, the R2
OS statistics for the technical forecasts are quite sizable during recessions, ranging
from approximating 1.50%–3.00%. The POOL-TECH forecast also achieves a markedly higher
R2
OS during recessions vis-´ a-vis expansions: 2.02% versus  0:52%, respectively, where the former
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
As shown in Figure 3, the technical forecasts almost always drop below the historical average
forecast—often substantially so—throughout recessions. There are also expansionary episodes,
especially for MA and volume (momentum) forecasts based on small l (m) values, where the
technical forecasts frequently fall below the historical average forecast. The fourth column of
Table I, Panel B indicates that these declines detract from the accuracy of the technical forecasts
during expansions. The ﬁfth and seventh columns of Panel B show that the average technical
forecasts are uniformly lower during recessions than expansions; this is especially the case for MA
and volume (momentum) forecasts based on large l (m) values, which offer the largest accuracy
10Goyal and Welch (2008) employ this device to assess the consistency of out-of-sample predictive ability.
12gains, among the technical rules, during recessions.
Analogous to Figure 2, Figure 4 graphs the cumulative differences in square prediction errors
between the historical average forecast and forecasts based on technical rules. The positive slopes
of the curves during recessions in Figure 4 show that most of the technical forecasts consistently
produce out-of-sample gains during these periods. But the curves are almost always ﬂat or neg-
atively sloped for the technical forecasts outside of recessions, so that out-of-sample gains are
nearly limited to recessions. Taken together, the results in Table I and Figures 2 and 4 highlight the
relevance of business-cycle ﬂuctuations for equity premium predictability using either economic
fundamentals or technical rules. Section III explores the ability of general equilibrium models that
link equity premium predictability to macroeconomic shocks to account for these out-of-sample
predictability patterns in the data.
Heretofore, we have generated equity premium forecasts separately using fundamental and
technical analysis. Can employing economic fundamentals and technical rules in conjunction pro-
duce additional out of sample gains? We address this issue in the context of the POOL-ECON
and POOL-TECH forecasts, which conveniently summarize information from the fundamental
and technical approaches. Speciﬁcally, we form a pooled forecast as a convex combination of
the POOL-ECON and POOL-TECH forecasts. We estimate the combining weights for these con-
ceptually distinct forecasts by maximizing the R2
OS computed over a holdout out-of-sample period
(Geweke and Amisano (2009)). The initial holdout out-of-sample period covers the ﬁrst 15 years
of the out-of-sample period (1960:01–1974:12), and the combining weights are computed using a
rolling estimation window over the remainder of the forecast evaluation period. For the 1960:01–
1974:12period, wesimplyaveragethePOOL-ECONandPOOL-TECHforecasts. Thebottomrow
ofTableI,denotedPOOL-ALL,reportstheresults. ThePOOL-ALLforecastdeliversahigherR2
OS,
0.89% (which is signiﬁcant at the 1% level), than any of the individual fundamental or technical
forecasts, as well as the POOL-ECON and POOL-TECH forecasts, for the full 1960:01–2008:12
period. Not surprisingly, the POOL-ALL forecast produces a substantially higher R2
OS during re-
cessions relative to expansions (2.40% and 0.27%, respectively, where the former is signiﬁcant at
the 1% level).
C. Reality Check
When considering a host of potential predictors, “data snooping” concerns naturally arise. Sul-
livan, Timmermann, and White (1999) use the White (2000) reality check to assess the importance
13of data snooping when analyzing technical trading rules. We make two modiﬁcations to the White
(2000) reality check for our framework. First, we use Hansen’s (2005) studentized version of
White’s (2000) maximum statistic, which is potentially more powerful. Second, we generate a p-
valuefortheHansen(2005)statisticusingawildﬁxed-regressorbootstrapprocedure. AsClarkand
McCracken (2010) emphasize, the asymptotic and ﬁnite-sample properties of the nonparametric
bootstrap procedures in White (1999) and Hansen (2005) do not generally apply when comparing
forecasts from multiple models that all nest the benchmark model, as in our application. Clark
and McCracken (2010), however, show that a wild ﬁxed-regressor bootstrap procedure delivers
asymptotically valid critical values for the studentized maximum statistic when comparing nested
forecasts. They also ﬁnd that this bootstrap procedure has good ﬁnite-sample properties.
We use the studentized maximum statistic for a quadratic loss function (in accord with the
R2
OS statistic) to test whether any of the 14 economic fundamental, twelve technical rule, and three
pooled forecasts in Table I has lower expected loss than the historical average benchmark fore-
cast.11 For the 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evaluation period, the studentized maximum statistic is
2.46. Based on the wild ﬁxed-regressor bootstrap (described in the appendix), the corresponding
p-value is 1.00%, so that we reject the null hypothesis that none of the competing forecasts outper-
forms the historical average benchmark in terms of expected quadratic loss. Data snooping cannot
readily explain the out-of-sample equity premium predictability in Table I.
D. Utility Gains
Table II reports average utility gains, in annualized percent, for a mean-variance investor with
a risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve who allocates monthly across stocks and risk-free bills using
fundamental (Panel A), technical (Panel B), or pooled (Panel C) forecasts of the equity premium
relative to the historical average benchmark forecast. The results in Panel A indicate that fore-
casts based on economic fundamentals often produce sizable utility gains vis-´ a-vis the historical
average benchmark. The utility gain is above 1% for six of the individual fundamentals (as well
as POOL-ECON) in the second column, so that the investor would be willing to pay an annual
management fee of a full percentage point or more to have access to forecasts based on economic
fundamentals relative to the historical average forecast. Similar to Table I, the out-of-sample gains
are typically concentrated in recessions. Consider, for example, DY, which generates the largest
11Let dh;t+1 = (rt+1   ¯ rt+1)2  (rt+1   ˆ rh;t+1)2, where ˆ rh;t+1 is an economic, technical, or pooled forecast indexed
by h (h = 1;:::;H), and ¯ dh = q 1
2 å
q2
k=1dh;q1+k. The studentized maximum statistic for quadratic loss is then given by
tmax = maxh=1;:::;H q
1=2
2 ¯ dh ˆ S
 1=2
h , where ˆ Sh = q 1
2 å
q2
k=1(dh;q1+k   ¯ dh)2.
14utility gain (1.82%) for the full 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evaluation period. The utility gain is
slightly negative ( 0:17%) during expansions, while it is a very sizable 13.02% during recessions.
DP, TBL, LTY, LTR, TMS, and DFR also provide utility gains above 5% during recessions. The
POOL-ECON forecast provides more consistent gains across expansions (0.97%) and recessions
(1.66%), although the gains are still more sizable during recessions.
Figure 5 portrays the equity portfolio weights computed based on fundamental and historical
average forecasts. Because the investor uses the same volatility forecast for all of the portfolio
allocations, only the equity premium forecasts produce differences in the equity weights. Figure 5
shows that the equity weight computed using the historical average forecast is procyclical, which,
given that the historical average forecast of the equity premium is relatively smooth, primarily
reﬂects changes in expected volatility: the rolling-window estimate of volatility tends to be coun-
teryclical, leading to a procyclical equity weight for the risk-averse investor.12 The equity weights
based on economic fundamentals often deviate substantially from the equity weight based on the
historical average, with a tendency for the weights computed using economic fundamentals to lie
below the historical average weight during expansions and move closer to or above the histori-
cal average weight during recessions. Panel A of Table II indicates that these deviations create
signiﬁcant utility gains for our mean-variance investor, especially during recessions.
Allbutoneoftheutilitygainsbasedonthetechnicalforecastsarepositiveinthesecondcolumn
of Table II, Panel B for the full 1960:01–2008:12 out-of-sample period. Eight of the individual
technical forecasts (as well as POOL-TECH) provide utility gains above 1%, with the MA(1,12)
forecast generating the largest gain (3.07%). Comparing the fourth and sixth columns, the utility
gains are substantially higher during recessions than during expansions. The MA(1,12) forecast
provides a leading example: during expansions, the utility gain is 0.97%, while it jumps to 14.97%
during recessions. In all, eight of the individual technical forecasts and the POOL-TECH forecast
produce utility gains above 10% during recessions. The ﬁfth and seventh columns reveal that the
average equity weight is lower during recessions than expansions for all of the TECH forecasts.
The differences between the average equity weights across business-cycle phases are especially
sizable for MA and volume (momentum) forecasts based on large l (m) values, and these l and m
values generate the largest gains during recessions.
Figure 6 further illustrates that technical forecast weights tend to decrease during recessions,
12French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), Schwert (1989, 1990), Whitelaw (1994), Harvey (2001), Ludvigson and
Ng (2007), Lundblad (2007), and Lettau and Ludvigson (2009), among others, also ﬁnd evidence of countercyclical
expected volatility using alternative volatility estimators.
15dropping below the weight based on the historical average forecast during cyclical downturns.
Again recalling that the investor uses the same rolling-window variance estimator for all portfolio
allocations, these declining weights reﬂect decreases in the technical forecasts during recessions,
as discussed in the context of Figure 3.
Overall, Table II shows that equity premium forecasts based on both economic fundamentals
and technical rules usually generate sizable utility gains, especially during recessions, highlight-
ing the economic signiﬁcance of equity premium predictability using either approach. Comparing
Panels A and B of Table II, technical forecasts typically provide larger utility gains than economic
forecasts over the full 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evaluation period and during recessions. Never-
theless, the best-performing economic variable in Table II, DY, generates utility gains reasonably
comparable to those of the best-performing technical forecasts.
To again explore potential beneﬁts to using economic fundamentals and technical rules in con-
junction, the bottom row of Table II reports utility gains for the POOL-ALL forecast. The POOL-
ALL forecast generates a utility gain of 1.97% for the full 1960:01–2008:12 out-of-sample period.
This is greater than the gain for each of the individual fundamental forecasts, as well as the POOL-
ECON forecast, so that employing economic fundamentals and technical rules in conjunction for
the purpose of asset allocation offers gains relative to using economic fundamentals alone. The
POOL-ALL forecast generates a utility gain greater than that of eight of the twelve individual
technical forecasts and the POOL-TECH forecast. While certain individual technical forecasts
produce larger utility gains than the POOL-ALL forecast, it will likely prove difﬁcult to iden-
tify these particular technical rules a priori, so that the POOL-ALL forecast provides a practical
advantage over using technical rules in isolation.
E. A Closer Look at Forecast Behavior Near Cyclical Peaks and Troughs
Tables I and II and Figures 1–6 present somewhat of a puzzle. For equity premium forecasts
based on both economic fundamentals and technical rules, out-of-sample gains are typically con-
centrated in business-cycle recessions. However, equity premium forecasts based on economic
fundamentals often increase during recessions, while forecasts based on technical rules are usually
substantially lower during recessions than expansions. Despite the apparent differences in the be-
havior of the two types of forecasts during recessions, the out-of-sample gains are concentrated in
cyclical downturns for both approaches. Why?
We investigate this issue by examining the behavior of the actual equity premium and the
16fundamental and technical forecasts around business-cycle peaks and troughs, which deﬁne the
beginnings and ends of recessions, respectively. We ﬁrst estimate the following regression model
around business-cycle peaks:
rt   ¯ rt = aP+
4
å
k= 2
bP;kIP
k;t +eP;t; (11)
where IP
k;t is an indicator variable that takes a value of unity k months after an NBER-dated
business-cycle peak and zero otherwise. The estimated bP;k coefﬁcients measure the incremen-
tal change in the average difference between the realized equity premium and historical average
forecast k months after a cyclical peak. We then estimate a corresponding model that replaces rt
with ˆ rt, where ˆ rt signiﬁes a fundamental or technical forecast of the equity premium:
ˆ rt   ¯ rt = aP+
4
å
k= 2
bP;kIP
k;t +eP;t: (12)
The slope coefﬁcients describe the incremental change in the average difference between a fun-
damental or technical forecast relative to the historical average forecast k periods after a cyclical
peak. Similarly, we measure the incremental change in the average behavior of the realized equity
premium and the fundamental and technical forecasts around business-cycle troughs:
rt   ¯ r = aT +å
2
k= 4bT;kIT
k;t +eT;t; (13)
ˆ rt   ¯ rt = aT +å
2
k= 4bT;kIT
k;t +eT;t; (14)
where IT
k;t is an indicator variable equal to unity k months after an NBER-dated business-cycle
trough and zero otherwise.
The ﬁrst panel of Figure 7 graphs OLS slope coefﬁcient estimates (in percent) and 90% conﬁ-
dence bands for (11), and the remaining panels depict corresponding estimates for (12) based on
the economic fundamentals. The ﬁrst panel shows that the actual equity premium tends to move
signiﬁcantly below the historical average forecast one month before through two months after a
business-cycle peak. The remaining panels in Figure 7 indicate that most economic fundamentals
fail to pick up this decline in the equity premium early in recessions. Only the LTR, TMS, and
INFL forecasts fall signiﬁcantly below the historical average forecast for any of the months early
in recessions when the equity premium itself is lower than average. The TMS forecast does the
best job of matching the lower-than-average actual equity premium for the month before through
two months after a peak. However, the TMS forecast is also signiﬁcantly lower than the historical
average forecast two months before and three and four months after a peak, unlike the actual equity
17premium. The LTR forecast is signiﬁcantly below the historical average during the two months af-
ter a peak, matching the actual equity premium, but it fails to track the actual equity premium prior
to a peak. Although the conﬁdence bands signal a signiﬁcant decrease in the INFL forecast in the
immediate months after a peak, the magnitude of the decline is small. Overall, Figure 7 suggests
that equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals are not particularly adept at detect-
ing the typical decline in the equity premium near cyclical peaks. Only the LTR and TMS forecasts
exhibit sizable decreases near peaks; this variation presumably contributes to the forecasting gains
for these variables in Tables I and II.
How do the equity premium forecasts based on technical rules behave near cyclical peaks? The
ﬁrst panel of Figure 8 again shows estimates for (11), while the other panels graph estimates for
(12) for the technical forecasts. Figure 8 reveals that MA and volume (momentum) forecasts based
on l (m) values of 6–12 (9–12) and the POOL-TECH and POOL-ALL forecasts move substan-
tially below the historical average forecast in the months immediately following a cyclical peak,
in accord with the behavior of the actual equity premium. Given that the actual equity premium
moves substantially below average in the month before and month of a business-cycle peak, it is
not surprising that technical forecasts are nearly all lower than the historical average in the ﬁrst
two months after a peak, since the technical forecasts are based on signals that recognize trends
in equity prices. This trend-following behavior early in recessions apparently helps to generate
the sizable out-of-sample gains during recessions for the MA and volume (momentum) forecasts
based on large l (m) values in Tables I and II. The technical forecasts in Figure 8 tend to remain
well below the historical average for too long after a peak, however.
Figures 9 and 10 depict estimates of the slope coefﬁcients in (13) and (14) for the fundamental
and technical forecasts, respectively. The ﬁrst panel in each ﬁgure shows that the actual equity
premium moves signiﬁcantly above the historical average forecast in the fourth through second
months before a cyclical trough, so that the equity premium is higher than usual in the late stages
of recessions. Figure 9 indicates that many of the fundamental forecasts, particularly those based
on valuation ratios (DP, DY, EP, and BM) and LTR, are also signiﬁcantly higher than the historical
average forecast in the fourth through second months before a trough. TMS, DFY, and POOL-
ECON are also signiﬁcantly above the historical average in the later stages of recessions, although
by less than the previously mentioned fundamentals. The ability of many of the fundamental
forecasts to match the higher-than-average equity premium late in recessions helps to account for
the sizable out-of-sample gains during recessions for the fundamental forecasts in Tables I and II.
18Figure 10 shows that the technical forecasts typically start low but rise quickly late in reces-
sions, in contrast to the pattern in the actual equity premium. Only the MA(1,3) and MA(1,6) fore-
casts are above the historical average forecast in the second and third months prior to a business-
cycle trough. The out-of-sample gains for the technical forecasts during recessions in Tables I and
IIthusoccurdespitetherelativelypoorperformanceoftechnicalforecastslateinrecessions. While
the trend-following technical forecasts detect the decrease in the actual equity premium early in
recessions (see Figure 8), they are less adept at recognizing the unusually high actual equity pre-
mium late in recessions. Note that the POOL-ALL forecast is signiﬁcantly above the historical
average forecast late in recessions, although the increase is small.
In summary, Figures 7–10 paint the following nuanced picture with respect to the sizable out-
of-sample gains during recessions in Tables I and II. Economic fundamentals typically fail to detect
the decline in the actual equity premium early in recessions, but generally do detect the increase
in the actual equity premium late in recessions. Technical rules exhibit the opposite pattern: they
pick up the decline in the actual premium early in recessions but fail to match the unusually high
premium late in recessions. Although fundamental and technical forecasts both generate sub-
stantial out-of-sample gains during recessions, they capture different aspects of equity premium
ﬂuctuations during cyclical downturns. Together with the performance of the POOL-ALL fore-
cast, this suggests that fundamental and technical analysis provide complementary approaches to
out-of-sample equity premium predictability.
III. Accounting for Out-of-Sample Predictability
We next explore whether the well-known Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit-formation
model or Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risks model could produce the out-of-sample forecast-
ing gains in Section II. These models link time-varying equilibrium expected returns to macroeco-
nomic shocks. This makes them natural benchmarks in our context, since the out-of-sample gains
in Section II vary systematically over the business cycle.
To examine whether these models can explain the predictive ability of economic fundamentals
and technical rules, we simulate data from the habit-formation or long-run risks model, apply the
out-of-sample tests from Section II to the simulated data, and compare the degree of predictability
in the simulated and actual data. If the habit-formation or long-run risks model could produce the
equity premium predictability in Section II through rational expected equity premium ﬂuctuations,
then empirical p-values computed from the simulated data for the R2
OS statistics and utility gains
19in Tables I and II should be “large.”13
A. Habit-Formation Model
Webrieﬂydescribethehabit-formationmodel; seeCampbellandCochrane(1999)andWachter
(2005) for details. The representative agent’s preferences over consumption (Ct) and an external
(or exogenous) habit (Xt) give rise to the ﬁrst-order Euler condition,
Et(Mt+1Rj;t+1) = 1; (15)
where Rj;t+1 is the gross return on asset j,
Mt+1  d

St+1
St
Ct+1
Ct
 g
(16)
is the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (or stochastic discount factor), d > 0 (g > 0) is
the time-preference (utility-curvature) parameter, and St is surplus consumption,
St 
Ct  Xt
Ct
; (17)
which is related to the local curvature of the utility function (or risk aversion): ht  g=St. Intu-
itively, a “small” St represents a “bad” state in which consumption is near habit. As St decreases
and ht increases, the representative investor becomes more risk averse.
The log of surplus consumption obeys the following heteroskedastic, autoregressive process:
st+1 = (1 f)¯ s+fst +l(st)[Dct+1 Et(Dct+1)]; (18)
where st log(St), ¯ s is the unconditional mean of st, f is the persistence parameter for st, l(st) de-
scribes the sensitivity of log surplus consumption to consumption growth shocks, and ct log(Ct).
The sensitivity function is given by
l(st) = (1=¯ S)
p
1 2(st   ¯ s) 1; (19)
where ¯ S = sv
p
g=(1 f) and ¯ s = log(¯ S).14 The log of consumption follows a random walk with
drift:
Dct+1 = g+vt+1; (20)
13This approach is similar in spirit to Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), who calculate empirical p-values
to examine whether GARCH processes can explain the proﬁtability of technical strategies. Fama (1991) emphasizes
that this type of exercise is a test of the joint null of market efﬁciency and a particular model of equilibrium expected
returns, so that either the failure of market efﬁciency or an inadequate model of equilibrium expected returns could
lead to a rejection of the joint null.
14Campbell and Cochrane (1999) select this speciﬁcation so that the risk-free real interest rate is constant. They
observe that the behavior of excess returns is not sensitive to this assumption. To ensure that (19) is positive, they also
assume that st < smax, where smax = ¯ s+(1=2)(1  ¯ S2).
20where Dct+1 = ct+1 ct and vt+1  i.i.d. N(0;s2
v).
The aggregate stock market represents a claim to the future consumption stream. Let Rt+1 =
(Pt+1+Dt+1)=Pt denote the gross aggregate stock market return, where Pt is the stock price (ex-
cluding dividends) and Dt is the dividend. In this endowment economy,Ct = Dt in equilibrium, so
that Pt=Ct also represents the price-dividend ratio, Pt=Dt.15 Using Pt=Ct = Pt=Dt, Rj;t+1 = Rt+1,
and rewriting (15), we have
Et

Mt+1

Pt+1
Dt+1
(st+1)+1

Ct+1
Ct

=
Pt
Dt
(st); (21)
where Pt=Dt is a function of st, the only state variable for the economy. A closed-form solution
is not available for Pt=Dt; we use the Wachter (2005) series method to numerically approximate
this pricing function.16 Observe that Pt=Dt is monotonically increasing in st. Intuitively, a lower
st value implies that consumption is closer to habit, making the representative investor more risk
averse, so that lower stock prices (higher expected returns) are required for the investor to willingly
hold risky stocks.
With assumed values for d, g, f, g, and sv, we can simulate consumption, dividend, stock
price, and equity premium data using the habit-formation model. When simulating data, we use
the parameter values (reported in the notes to Table III) from Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
They select these parameter values to match certain moments of U.S. postwar data and show that
the habit-formation model reproduces key features of the data, including the “high” average equity
premium and “low” risk-free rate. The habit-formation model generates two of the economic fun-
damentals considered in Section II, DP and DY, which happen to produce the largest out-of-sample
gains among the economic fundamentals in Tables I and II.17 With respect to the technical fore-
casts, thesimulatedpricedataallowustocomputetradingsignalsbasedontheMAandmomentum
rules (but not the volume-based rules).
We compute empirical p-values for the R2
OS statistics and average utility gains corresponding
to the DP, DY, MA, and momentum forecasts in Tables I and II via the following steps:
1. Use the habit-formation model to generate a pseudo sample of 984 observations for con-
sumption, dividends, stock prices, and the equity premium. This pseudo sample has the
same length as the original sample (1927:01–2008:12).
15Campbell and Cochrane (1999) also consider a model where consumption and dividends are imperfectly corre-
lated and ﬁnd that stock returns behave very similarly to theCt = Dt case.
16Wachter (2005) ﬁnds that the series method provides a better approximation than the ﬁxed-point method used by
Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
17Wachter (2006) extends the habit-formation model by including multiple bonds to investigate term-structure im-
plications of habit formation.
212. For the pseudo sample, construct pseudo out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on
DP, DY, MA(1,l), and MOM(m) (l;m = 3;6;9;12), as well as the historical average, for the
last 588 observations, matching the length of the forecast evaluation period in the original
sample (1960:01–2008:12).
3. Compute R2
OS statistics and average utility gains for the pseudo DP, DY, MA, and momentum
forecasts. In addition to computing R2
OS statistics and utility gains for the full forecast evalu-
ation period of the pseudo sample, we compute these statistics for business-cycle expansions
and contractions.18 For the simulated consumption data, we identify business-cycle peaks
and troughs that deﬁne expansions and recessions using the Harding and Pagan (2002) mod-
iﬁed Bry and Boschan (1971, BB) algorithm, which provides a good approximation to the
NBER business-cycle dating methodology.19
4. Repeat steps 1–3 1,000 times, generating empirical distributions for the R2
OS statistics and
average utility gains for the DP, DY, MA, and momentum forecasts for the full forecast
evaluation period, expansions, and recessions.
5. For each statistic, the empirical p-value is the proportion of simulated statistics greater than
the corresponding statistic in Table I or II computed using the original data.
The second through fourth columns of Table III report empirical p-values for the R2
OS statistics
in Table I based on the habit-formation model. The empirical p-values in Table III, Panel A do
not signal signiﬁcance at conventional levels, so that the habit-formation model’s rational expected
equity premium ﬂuctuations can account for the out-of-sample predictive ability of DP and DY, as
measured by R2
OS, in the actual data. In the habit-formation model, st declines—and risk aversion
increases—over the course of a recession, thereby elevating the expected equity premium over re-
cessions. This is consistent with the behavior of DP and DY near cyclical troughs in Figure 9, so
that this mechanism appears capable of explaining the predictive power of DP and DY captured by
R2
OS in the actual data. While the habit-formation model can account for the DP and DY R2
OS statis-
tics in the actual data, a number of the empirical p-values in the second through fourth columns
of Table III, Panel B indicate signiﬁcance at conventional levels for the MA and momentum R2
OS
18The process in (20) represents the evolution of the real economy in the habit-formation model. It is well known
that such a process can generate business-cycle-like patterns, with peaks and troughs corresponding to similar turning
points identiﬁed by the NBER.
19We implement the modiﬁed BB algorithm using James Engel’s MATLAB code downloaded from
http://www.ncer.edu.au/data/.
22statistics over the full out-of-sample period and recessions. Rational expected equity premium
ﬂuctuations from the habit-formation model thus cannot account for the predictive power of MA
and momentum rules, as measured by R2
OS, in the actual data.
The eighth through tenth columns of Table III report empirical p-values generated from the
habit-formation model corresponding to the average utility gains in Table II. The empirical p-
values in Table III, Panel A point to signiﬁcant utility gains for DP and DY over the full forecast
evaluation period (p-values of 4.50% and 1.40%, respectively) and for DY during recessions (p-
value of 8.70%). In interpreting these gains, keep in mind that the habit-formation model generates
time variation in the expected equity premium in response to time-varying risk aversion on the part
of the representative investor. When computing average utility gains, however, we consider an
investor with a constant risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve. Our non-representative investor with
constant risk aversion can thus exploit the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) representative investor’s
time-varying risk aversion by holding more stocks during periods when the equilibrium expected
market return is elevated due to the representative investor’s low habit/high risk aversion.20 From
this perspective, the signiﬁcant empirical p-values represent signiﬁcant utility gains beyond those
exploitable by a non-representative investor resulting from time-varying risk aversion on the part
of the representative investor. The empirical p-values in the eighth through tenth columns of
Table III, Panel B reveal signiﬁcant utility gains at the 1% level over the full out-of-sample period
and recessions for MA and momentum forecasts based on l;m = 6;9;12. In summary, Table III
indicates that the habit-formation model cannot fully account for the out-of-sample forecasting
gains offered by economic fundamentals and, especially, technical rules.
B. Long-Run Risks Model
Turning to the long-run risks model, we again brieﬂy describe the model; Bansal and Yaron
(2004) and Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2009) provide the details. The representative agent has
Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) recursive preferences, so that the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution in (15) becomes
Mt+1  dq (Ct+1=Ct)
 q=y R
 (1 q)
c;t+1 Rj;t+1; (22)
where g is the risk-aversion parameter, y is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, q  (1 
g)=[1 (1=y)], and Rc;t+1 is the gross return on an asset that pays aggregate consumption as its
20This brings to mind the well-known Warren Buffett quote: “We simply attempt to be fearful when others are
greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.”
23dividend each period. The following processes govern consumption and the dividend paid on the
market portfolio:
Dct+1 = mc+xt +stht+1; (23)
xt+1 = rxt +jestet+1; (24)
s2
t+1 = ¯ s2+n(s2
t   ¯ s2)+swwt+1; (25)
Ddt+1 = md +fxt +pstht+1+jdstut+1; (26)
where dt  log(Dt); Dt is the dividend paid on the market portfolio; and ht+1, et+1, wt+1, and
ut+1 are contemporaneously uncorrelated i.i.d. N(0;1) shocks. The variable xt+1 is the predictable
component of consumption growth, while s2
t+1 represents time-varying consumption risk. Bansal,
Kiku, and Yaron (2009) add the ps2
t ht+1 term in (26) to the original Bansal and Yaron (2004)
speciﬁcation to allow for an additional source of aggregate market risk. Bansal and Yaron (2004)
show that s2
t generates variability in the expected equity premium.
We follow Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2009) in analytically approximating the solution to the
long-run risks model. The familiar Campbell and Shiller (1988a) log-linear approximation mea-
sures the return on the aggregate market portfolio:
rm;t+1 = k0;m+k1;mzm;t+1 zm;t +Ddt+1; (27)
where zm;t =log(Pt=Dt) and k0;m and k1;m are log-linearization constants that are computed as part
of the model solution based on the steady-state value of zm;t. The relevant state variables are xt and
s2
t , so that the solution for zm;t takes the form,
zm;t = A0;m+A1;mxt +A2;ms2
t ; (28)
where A0;m, A1;m, and A2;m are functions of the preference and technology parameters (see (12) in
the appendix to Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2009) for the exact expressions). Armed with (23)–(26)
and (28), we can simulate consumption, dividend, stock price, and equity premium data using the
long-runrisksmodelandpreferenceandtechnologyparametervaluesfromTableIinBansal, Kiku,
and Yaron (2009). These parameter values (reported in the notes to Table III) are calibrated from
particular moments in U.S. data and enable the long-run risks model to account for the U.S. equity
premium and risk-free rate puzzles. We generate empirical p-values based on the long-run risks
model in a manner analogous to the procedure described for the habit-formation model.
Empirical p-values corresponding to the R2
OS statistics in Table I based on the long-run risks
model are given in the ﬁfth through seventh columns of Table III. Panel A of Table III indicates
24that the long-run risks model cannot account for the out-of-sample predictive ability of DP and DY,
as measured by R2
OS, for the full out-of-sample period and recessions, with empirical p-values of
2.60% and 1.60% (3.00% and 6.90%) for DP (DY) during the full period and recessions, respec-
tively. Furthermore, Table III, Panel B demonstrates that the long-run risks model fails to explain
the predictive ability of a number of the technical rules as captured by R2
OS, particularly during
recessions, where ﬁve of the empirical p-values in the seventh column are close to or less than
1%. The empirical p-values in the ﬁnal three columns of Table III clearly show that the long-run
risks model also cannot account for the out-of-sample equity premium predictability revealed by
the average utility gains in Table II: a number of the empirical p-values are very near or equal to
0% for both economic fundamentals and technical rules during the full forecast evaluation period
and recessions.
Overall, Table III points to the inability of the habit-formation and long-run risk models to
explain much of the out-of-sample equity premium predictability in the actual data. While the
habit-formation model accounts for the predictive ability of DP and DY, as measured by R2
OS, it
cannot account for the predictive power indicated by R2
OS for MA and momentum rules for the
full out-of-sample period and recessions. Moreover, the habit-formation model cannot explain
the average utility gains produced by economic fundamentals and technical rules during the full
forecast evaluation period and recessions. The long-run risks model generally fails to explain the
predictive ability of either economic fundamentals or technical rules, particulary during recessions.
IV. Conclusion
Fundamental and technical analysis are conceptually quite different methods of predicting ag-
gregate stock returns. Researchers have long studied both approaches, but the two literatures have
evolved largely independently; there has been little attempt to directly compare fundamental analy-
sis with technical analysis. This paper ﬁlls this gap by comparing monthly out-of-sample forecasts
of the U.S. equity premium for 1960–2008 generated with well-known economic fundamentals
and popular trend-following technical rules. We analyze equity premium forecasts using two out-
of-sample metrics: (i) the Campbell and Thompson (2008) R2
OS statistic and (ii) the average utility
gain for a mean-variance investor who optimally reallocates a monthly portfolio between equities
and risk-free Treasury bills using equity premium forecastsbased on either economic fundamentals
or technical rules relative to the historical average benchmark forecast.
Both economic fundamentals and technical rules produce economically and statistically signif-
25icant out-of-sample forecasting gains; moreover, these gains are highly concentrated in business-
cyclerecessions. Whilebothapproachesperformdisproportionatelywellduringrecessions, acare-
ful analysis of their performance during cyclical downturns reveals that they exploit very different
patterns: technical rules recognize the typical drop in the equity premium near business-cycle
peaks; economic fundamentals identify the typical increase in the equity premium near business-
cycle troughs. Thus, we ﬁnd that fundamental and technical analysis both signiﬁcantly forecast
returns and represent complementary approaches. Furthermore, we show that pooling informa-
tion from both economic fundamentals and technical rules can produce additional out-of-sample
forecasting gains.
We also simulate data from the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habit-formation and Bansal and
Yaron (2004) long-run risks models—two leading frameworks linking macroeconomic shocks to
rational time variation in the expected equity premium—to study whether these models can explain
the out-of-sample forecasting ability of economic fundamentals and technical rules. Empirical p-
values generated under the habit-formation and long-run risk models indicate that these models
fail to account for much of the forecasting gains in the actual data. We cannot, of course, exclude
the possibility that other models with a rational time-varying expected equity premium may better
explain the predictability in the data; see, for example, Bekaert, Engstrom, and Xing (2009) and
Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), who extend the habit-formation and/or long-run risks mod-
els along various dimensions. Behavioral inﬂuences also potentially play a key role in explaining
equity premium predictability over the business cycle. We deem the identiﬁcation of theoretical
models capable of explaining the out-of-sample predictive ability of economic fundamentals and
technical rules in the data an especially important area for future research.
26Appendix: Wild Fixed-Regressor Bootstrap
This appendix outlines the wild ﬁxed-regressor bootstrap used to calculate the p-value for the
Hansen (2005) studentized maximum statistic in our reality check. We ﬁrst estimate the constant
expected equity premium (random walk with drift) model, corresponding to the null of no pre-
dictability: ¯ r = å
T
t=1rt. We next estimate an unrestricted model that includes all of the potential
predictors as regressors using OLS; denote the OLS residuals from this model as fˆ utgT
t=1. We then
generate a pseudo sample of equity premium observations under the null of no predictability as
rt;b = ¯ r+vt;b ˆ ut for t = 1;:::;T, where vt;b is a draw from an i.i.d. N(0;1) process. Generating
residual draws in this manner allows for conditional heteroskedasticity and makes this a “wild”
bootstrap. Denote the pseudo sample of equity premium observations as frt;bgT
t=1. We compute
fundamental, technical, and pooled forecasts for the last q2 simulated equity premium observa-
tions using frb
t gT
t=1 in conjunction with the economic fundamentals and technical trading signals
from the original sample. Using fundamentals and signals from the original sample makes this a
“ﬁxed-regressor” bootstrap. Based on frt;bgT
t=q1+1 and the simulated forecasts, we compute the
studentized maximum statistic for the pseudo sample, tmax;b. Generating B = 1;000 pseudo sam-
ples in this manner yields an empirical distribution of studentized maximum statistics, ftmax;bgB
b=1.
The boostrapped p-value is given by B 1å
B
b=1Ib, where Ib =1 for tmax;b tmax and zero otherwise
and tmax is the studentized maximum statistic from the original sample (see footnote 11).
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32Table I
Out-of-sample equity premium forecasting results, 1960:01–2008:12
R2
OS is the Campbell and Thompson (2008) out-of-sample R2 statistic, which measures the percent re-
duction in mean square prediction error (MSPE) for the forecast given in the ﬁrst column relative to
the historical average benchmark forecast. POOL-ECON (POOL-TECH) is a pooled forecast based on
the individual fundamental (technical) forecasts in Panel A (Panel B); POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast
based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. The R2
OS statistics and average forecasts
are computed for the entire 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evaluation period (second and third columns) and
separately for NBER-dated business-cycle expansions (fourth and ﬁfth columns) and recessions (sixth
and seventh columns). Average forecast is the average predicted equity premium during the indicated
period. Statistical signiﬁcance of R2
OS is assessed with the Clark and West (2007) MSPE-adjusted statistic
corresponding to the null hypothesis of equal MSPE against the alternative hypothesis that the forecast
indicated in the ﬁrst column has a lower MSPE than the historical average benchmark forecast; , , and
 indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Overall Expansion Recession
Average Average Average
Predictor R2
OS (%) forecast (%) R2
OS (%) forecast (%) R2
OS (%) forecast (%)
Panel A: Fundamental forecasts
DP 0.73 0.25 0.15 0.21 2.15 0.52
DY 0.71 0.22  0.26 0.17 3.09 0.48
EP  0.19 0.49  0.15 0.44  0.28 0.78
DE  0.76 0.79  0.80 0.80  0.65 0.75
SVAR  0.56 0.67  0.60 0.67  0.48 0.68
BM  1.64 0.50  1.57 0.41  1.79 1.02
NTIS  1.75 0.98  0.34 0.96  5.20 1.11
TBL 0.31 0.38 0.11 0.40 0.80 0.28
LTY 0.42 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.85 0.21
LTR 0.33 0.77  0.88 0.76 3.30 0.83
TMS 0.14 0.81  0.62 0.84 2.00 0.65
DFY 0.39 0.64 0.33 0.62 0.55 0.78
DFR 0.22 0.71 0.04 0.71 0.65 0.67
INFL 0.18 0.64 0.20 0.67 0.14 0.50
Panel B: Technical forecasts
MA(1,3)  0.58 0.69  1.09 0.70 0.67 0.61
MA(1,6)  0.68 0.70  2.16 0.76 2.94 0.34
MA(1,9) 0.08 0.69  0.98 0.74 2.68 0.38
MA(1,12) 0.78 0.71 0.04 0.78 2.59 0.33
MOM(3)  0.12 0.69  0.25 0.69 0.20 0.66
MOM(6) 0.18 0.69  0.48 0.74 1.79 0.43
MOM(9) 0.18 0.73  0.57 0.81 2.02 0.23
MOM(12) 0.26 0.71  0.26 0.77 1.53 0.41
VOL(1,3)  0.38 0.66  1.07 0.68 1.31 0.57
VOL(1,6)  0.29 0.66  1.02 0.68 1.50 0.52
VOL(1,9) 0.14 0.67  0.78 0.71 2.40 0.42
VOL(1,12) 0.42 0.65  0.55 0.71 2.82 0.32
Panel C: Pooled forecasts
POOL-ECON 0.80 0.58 0.72 0.57 1.01 0.66
POOL-TECH 0.22 0.69  0.52 0.73 2.02 0.44
POOL-ALL 0.89 0.63 0.27 0.63 2.40 0.59Table II
Asset-allocation results, 1960:01–2008:12
Average utility gain (D) is the portfolio management fee (in annualized percent return) that an investor with
mean-variance preferences and risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve would be willing to pay to have access to
the forecast given in the ﬁrst column relative to the historical average benchmark forecast. POOL-ECON
(POOL-TECH) is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental (technical) forecasts in Panel A
(Panel B); POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts.
The utility gains and average equity weights are computed for the entire 1960:01–2008:12 forecast evalu-
ation period (second and third columns) and separately for NBER-dated business-cycle expansions (fourth
and ﬁfth columns) and recessions (sixth and seventh columns). Average equity weight is the average value
during the indicated period.
Overall Expansion Recession
D Average D Average D Average
Predictor (ann. %) equity weight (ann. %) equity weight (ann. %) equity weight
Panel A: Fundamental forecasts
DP 1.44 0.28 0.12 0.22 8.76 0.62
DY 1.82 0.22  0.17 0.17 13.02 0.55
EP 1.23 0.53 0.76 0.48 3.71 0.81
DE  0.53 0.98  0.27 0.98  1.98 0.96
SVAR  0.31 0.88  0.25 0.88  0.66 0.88
BM  0.40 0.48  0.94 0.41 2.37 0.87
NTIS  0.49 1.06 0.47 1.05  5.97 1.12
TBL 1.65 0.53 0.71 0.55 6.92 0.40
LTY 1.63 0.42 0.82 0.44 6.22 0.30
LTR 0.68 0.94  0.56 0.94 7.50 0.95
TMS 1.21 0.97 0.12 1.00 7.27 0.79
DFY 0.43 0.82 0.20 0.80 1.61 0.96
DFR 0.92 0.91 0.09 0.92 5.60 0.85
INFL 0.68 0.85 0.22 0.87 3.33 0.68
Panel B: Technical forecasts
MA(1,3) 0.19 0.86  0.34 0.88 3.18 0.78
MA(1,6) 1.68 0.80  0.48 0.87 13.90 0.43
MA(1,9) 2.06 0.84 0.05 0.90 13.39 0.48
MA(1,12) 3.07 0.86 0.97 0.94 14.97 0.40
MOM(3)  0.07 0.89  0.22 0.89 0.81 0.86
MOM(6) 1.73 0.87 0.27 0.92 10.05 0.56
MOM(9) 3.01 0.84 1.00 0.94 14.47 0.27
MOM(12) 1.93 0.88 0.48 0.95 10.23 0.53
VOL(1,3) 0.62 0.86  0.31 0.88 5.81 0.75
VOL(1,6) 0.78 0.85  0.34 0.88 7.11 0.69
VOL(1,9) 1.66 0.85  0.37 0.90 13.17 0.55
VOL(1,12) 2.50 0.84  0.07 0.91 17.10 0.44
Panel C: Pooled forecasts
POOL-ECON 1.08 0.76 0.97 0.74 1.66 0.85
POOL-TECH 1.61 0.87 0.12 0.92 10.06 0.58
POOL-ALL 1.97 0.81 0.63 0.83 9.50 0.75Table III
Empirical p-values (in percent) based on simulated data
from habit-formation and long-run risks models
The table reports empirical p-values computed from 1,000 pseudo samples generated using either the Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) habit-formation or Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run risks model. The empirical p-values are the
percent of simulated R2
OS statistics and average utility gains greater than the corresponding values from Tables I and II.
The habit-formation model uses the following parameter values: d = 0:891=12, g = 2, f = 0:861=12, g = 0:0189=12, sv =
0:0150=
p
12. The long-run risks model uses the following parameter values: d = 0:9989, g = 10, y = 1:5, mc = 0:0015,
r = 0:975, je = 0:038, ¯ s = 0:0072, n = 0:999, sw = 0:0000028, md = 0:0015, f = 2:5, jd = 5:96, p = 2:6. ALL,
EXP, and REC refer to R2
OS statistics and average utility gains computing for the full sample, expansions, and recessions,
respectively.
R2
OS Average utility gain
Habit-formation model Long-run risks model Habit-formation model Long-run risks model
Predictor ALL EXP REC ALL EXP REC ALL EXP REC ALL EXP REC
Panel A: Economic forecasts
DP 52.20 92.00 19.20 2.60 34.90 1.60 4.50 62.00 13.40 0.00 24.90 0.00
DY 50.60 93.10 18.80 3.00 50.30 6.90 1.40 64.30 8.70 0.00 33.30 0.10
Panel B: Technical forecasts
MA(1,3) 94.20 97.60 19.20 94.10 97.50 7.00 13.20 72.10 9.00 10.40 72.70 0.60
MA(1,6) 95.70 99.90 1.30 95.70 99.80 0.20 0.40 84.70 0.00 0.00 83.80 0.00
MA(1,9) 10.70 97.50 2.80 12.90 97.60 0.10 0.00 18.50 0.00 0.00 20.60 0.00
MA(1,12) 0.30 17.80 3.20 0.20 20.80 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.90 0.00
MOM(3) 36.20 61.30 37.30 39.60 66.10 22.60 38.20 58.70 35.80 31.30 57.70 11.40
MOM(6) 7.80 86.50 5.50 8.20 87.70 0.90 0.10 6.30 0.50 0.00 8.30 0.00
MOM(9) 6.80 90.30 6.00 8.30 91.70 1.30 0.00 0.40 0.20 0.00 1.30 0.00
MOM(12) 3.70 57.70 10.90 4.00 65.40 2.40 0.10 2.40 0.60 0.00 3.10 0.101965 1975 1985 1995 2005
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Figure 1. Out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals, 1960:01–2008:12. Black and gray lines delineate equity premium
forecasts (in percent) based on the economic fundamental given in the panel heading and the historical average, respectively. POOL-ECON is a pooled forecast
based on the individual fundamental forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions.1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
DP       
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
DY       
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
EP       
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
DE       
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
SVAR     
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
BM       
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
NTIS     
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
TBL      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
LTY      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
LTR      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
TMS      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
DFY      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
DFR      
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
INFL     
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
POOL−ECON
Figure 2. Cumulative square prediction error differences, out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on the historical average and economic fun-
damentals, 1960:01–2008:12. The ﬁgure depicts cumulative differences between the mean square prediction errors for the historical average equity premium
forecast and the equity premium forecast based on the economic fundamental indicated in the panel heading. POOL-ECON is a pooled forecast based on the
individual fundamental forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions.1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
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Figure 3. Out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on technical rules, 1960:01–2008:12. Black and gray lines delineate equity premium forecasts
(in percent) based on the technical rule given in the panel heading and the historical average, respectively. POOL-TECH is a pooled forecast based on the individual
technical forecasts. POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle
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Figure 4. Cumulative square prediction error differences, out-of-sample equity premium forecasts based on the historical average and technical rules,
1960:01–2008:12. The ﬁgure depicts cumulative differences between the mean square prediction errors for the historical average equity premium forecast and the
equity premium forecast based on the technical rule indicated in the panel heading. POOL-TECH is a pooled forecast based on the individual technical forecasts.
POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions.1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
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Figure 5. Equity portfolio weights computed using equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals, 1960:01–2008:12. Black (gray) lines
delineate equity portfolio weights for an investor with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve who uses an equity premium forecast based
on the economic fundamental given in the panel heading (historical average forecast). POOL-ECON is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental
forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions.1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
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Figure 6. Equity portfolio weights computed using equity premium forecasts based on technical rules, 1960:01–2008:12. Black (gray) lines delineate
equity portfolio weights for an investor with mean-variance preferences and risk aversion coefﬁcient of ﬁve who uses an equity premium forecast based on the
technical rule given in the panel heading (historical average forecast). POOL-TECH is a pooled forecast based on the individual technical forecasts. POOL-ALL is
a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. Vertical bars depict NBER-dated business-cycle recessions.−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
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Figure 7. Actual equity premium and equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals near a U.S. business-cycle peak. The panels show
the incremental change in the average difference between the actual equity premium or equity premium forecast based on the economic fundamental given in
the panel heading and the historical average equity premium forecast two months before through four months after a business-cycle peak. POOL-ECON is a
pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental forecasts. All forecasts are measured in percent. Circles indicate point estimates and shaded areas depict 90%
conﬁdence bands.−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4
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Figure 8. Actual equity premium and equity premium forecasts based on technical rules near a U.S. business-cycle peak. The panels show the incre-
mental change in the average difference between the actual equity premium or equity premium forecast based on the technical rule given in the panel heading and
the historical average equity premium forecast two months before through four months after a business-cycle peak. POOL-TECH is a pooled forecast based on the
individual technical forecasts. POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. All forecasts are measured in percent.
Circles indicate point estimates and shaded areas depict 90% conﬁdence bands.−4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2
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Figure 9. Actual equity premium and equity premium forecasts based on economic fundamentals near a U.S. business-cycle trough. The panels show
the incremental change in the average difference between the actual equity premium or equity premium forecast based on the economic fundamental given in
the panel heading and the historical average equity premium forecast four months before through two months after a business-cycle trough. POOL-ECON is a
pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental forecasts. All forecasts are measured in percent. Circles indicate point estimates and shaded areas depict 90%
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Figure 10. Actual equity premium and equity premium forecasts based on technical rules near a U.S. business-cycle trough. The panels show the in-
cremental change in the average difference between the actual equity premium or equity premium forecast based on the technical rule given in the panel heading
and the historical average equity premium forecast four months before through two months after a business-cycle trough. POOL-TECH is a pooled forecast based
on the individual technical forecasts. POOL-ALL is a pooled forecast based on the individual fundamental and technical forecasts. All forecasts are measured in
percent. Circles indicate point estimates and shaded areas depict 90% conﬁdence bands.